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ARTS AND ARMS: AN EXAMINATION OF 
THE LOOTING OF THE NATIONAL 
MUSEUM OF IRAQ 
Courtney Campbell*
Abstract: In April 2003, the National Museum of Iraq was extensively 
looted. At the time, the United States was an occupying power of Iraq and 
subsequently bore the brunt of considerable international press specula-
tion that the United States was, at best, ill-prepared to protect the mu-
seum and, at worst, indifferent to the devastation wrought upon the con-
siderable number of priceless artifacts. Beyond international dismay, 
however, lay the possibility that the United States was bound by both cus-
tom and treaty to protect Iraq’s cultural property. Though the damage to 
the artifacts may be irreparable, there are solutions available to the 
United States that serve to both remedy past and protect against future 
destruction and loss of cultural property. 
Introduction 
 The arts and the army are unlikely bedfellows. During World War 
II, however, the U.S. military formed the Monuments, Fine Arts and 
Archives (MFAA) division to protect European cultural property during 
and after hostilities.1 As a result of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 
subsequent destruction of the National Museum of Iraq, scholars have 
called for the reformation of this division, terminated in 1946.2 Surpris-
ingly, despite the hostilities of 2003, the destruction was rendered not 
by bombs, but by looting.3
                                                                                                                      
* Courtney Campbell is the 2009–2010 Senior Note Editor of the Boston College Interna-
tional & Comparative Law Review. 
1 See generally Nat’l Archives and Records Admin., Records of the Am. Commiss’n 
for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas 
(The Roberts Commiss’n) (2007), available at http://www.archives.gov/research/micro- 
film/m1944.pdf [hereinafter Nat’l Archives]. 
2 See Constance Lowenthal & Stephen Urice, An Army for Art, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 2003, 
at A25. 
3 See Oriental Inst. of Univ. of Chi., Iraq Museum Database, http://oi.uchicago. 
edu/OI/IRAQ/dbfiles/Iraqdatabasehome.htm [hereinafter Iraq Museum Database] (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2009); see also Lowenthal & Urice, supra note 2, at A25. 
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 Although the true extent of the looting can only be estimated, it is 
clear that the United States did not deploy adequate troops to protect 
Iraqi cultural property despite appeals from cultural policy groups, 
academics and civilians.4 An estimated 15,000 artifacts remain missing 
from the museum.5 Iraq is considered the Cradle of Civilization and 
harbors priceless artifacts from Babylonian, Assyrian and Sumerian 
kingdoms.6 Some missing artifacts date from before 9000 B.C. while 
others represent the earliest human-made tools.7
 This Comment investigates the United States’ obligation as an oc-
cupying power to reasonably protect cultural property of the occupied 
nation’s war zones. The Comment focuses on the events of the Iraq 
War, specifically the preventable looting of the National Museum of 
Iraq. In the pages that follow, the Comment will explore whether and 
to what extent the obligation exists under international treaties and 
custom. 
 Part I focuses on the events surrounding the looting of the Na-
tional Museum of Iraq and discusses their import to the international 
community generally and to the United States’ past and future policy 
specifically. Part II provides the legal background on the U.S. obliga-
tion as an occupying power to reasonably protect cultural property. Fi-
nally, Part III proposes the existence of the United States’ obligation as 
an occupying power and suggests the possible remedies for the breach 
of its obligation, which largely focus on defining the obligation’s future 
applicability. 
I. Background 
 The United States has occupied Iraq since 2003 and is considered 
Iraq’s occupying power under the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civil Persons in Time of War (1949 Geneva Convention).8 
                                                                                                                      
4 See generally Editorial, Iraq’s Stolen Heritage, Asahi Shimbun ( Japan), Apr. 22, 2003, 
available at 2003 WLNR 8997677 (describing U.S. failure to make museum protection a 
priority or enforce control of the museum). 
5 Iraq Museum Database, supra note 3. 
6 Mark Vallen, We Are the Heirs of 3000 Years of Civilization, Art for a Change, Dec. 
2003, http://www.art-for-a-change.com/News/iraq.htm. 
7 Iraq Museum Database, supra note 3. 
8 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil Persons in Time of War 
arts. 2, 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 
1949]; see also Press Release, Security Council, Acting on Iraq’s Request, Extends “For Last 
Time” Mandate of Multinational Force, U.N. Doc. SC/9207 (Dec. 18, 2007) (illustrating 
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s willingness to extend mandate of Multinational 
Force in Iraq in Annex II). 
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During its time as an occupying power, the United States has not ade-
quately protected Iraqi zones of cultural property.9 The United States’ 
failure to protect Iraqi zones of cultural property was internationally 
recognized through press coverage of several days of looting at the Na-
tional Museum of Iraq.10 Though the international press initially exag-
gerated the severity of the looting, the incident nonetheless exacer-
bated the perception of U.S. indifference.11
 The National Museum of Iraq’s looting from April 9 to April 11, 
2003 resulted in the loss of 15,000 artifacts.12 Since 2003, about 5000 
pieces have been returned, such as the famous Warka Vase which dates 
to 3000 B.C., though many have been lost or damaged.13 The United 
States and the United Kingdom have led efforts to return the stolen 
artifacts.14 Despite these efforts, the international public has expressed 
dismay at the lack of foresight of the U.S. Army.15 Indeed, the lead U.S. 
investigator into the looting shares the sense of international dismay.16
 The international reaction to the looting warrants an investigation 
into the existence of an obligation of the United States to reasonably 
protect cultural property.17 Negative international reaction to the loot-
ing of the museum was extended to the war itself.18 If the United States 
offends international sentiment by neglecting to respect national cul-
tural property, it can expect an adverse impact on its diplomacy and 
global perception generally.19
 Investigating the existence of a U.S. obligation to reasonably pro-
tect cultural property is furthermore important in terms of the United 
States’ responsibility to maintain public order as an occupying power.20 
                                                                                                                      
 
9 See Dan Vergano, On the Trail of Stolen Iraqi Art, USA Today, Nov. 3, 2005, at D1. 
10 See id. 
11 See David Aaronovitch, Lost from the Baghdad Museum: Truth, Guardian (London), 
June 10, 2003, at 5. 
12 William Harms, Archaeologists Review Loss of Valuable Artifacts One Year After Looting, 
Univ. Chi. Chron., Apr. 15, 2004, at 15. 
13 Id. 
14 See Mark Brown, British Museum and Army Team Up in Move to Rescue Iraq’s Heritage, 
Guardian (London), Feb. 26, 2008, at 15. 
15 Vergano, supra note 9. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
19 See Mark Schone, The Looting of Iraq: Robbing the Cradle of Civilization, Five Years Later, Sa-
lon.com, Mar. 20, 2008, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/03/20/iraq_roundtable 
(emphasizing the importance of the military’s cultural awareness, as well as the global preva-
lence of and interest in the looting). 
20 See Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of Land art. 43, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Convention 1907]; see, e.g.,  Lowen-
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The Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of Land, to 
which the United States is a party, requires an occupying power like the 
United States in Iraq to maintain public order.21 It does not, however, 
specify whether preventing this type of looting is a tenet of maintaining 
public order.22 As weapons become more precise, the United States will 
grow increasingly accountable for destruction wrought because of the 
increased measure of control it possesses; it is possible that the United 
States will be held increasingly accountable for destruction of cultural 
property not only by weapons but also by human looting.23
 Though this investigation is relevant in light of future concerns 
over the American presence in Iraq and potentially in other nations, it is 
rooted in the past.24 Even if the United States is not bound by the 1949 
Geneva Convention to reasonably protect cultural property, it may have 
obligations under international customary law formed decades ago.25
 In World War II, the U.S. Army formed the MFAA section to com-
bat the destruction of European heritage.26 Although the federal Rob-
erts Commission that advised the MFAA did not explicitly state its for-
mation was out of consideration for international law or obligation, its 
scope was international.27 The Roberts Commission consulted exten-
sively with the British government to determine which pieces of art 
were unaccounted for and to devise plans for regaining them.28 The 
Roberts Commission also established liaisons with French, Dutch, and 
Belgian governments favoring restitution and reparations.29 The U.S. 
government continued presidential efforts through the auspices of the 
Roberts Commission until the commission’s termination in 1946.30
                                                                                                                      
thal & Urice, supra note 2, at A25 (stating looting occurred as product of the “chaos that 
engulfed Baghdad”). 
21 See Hague Convention 1907, supra note 20. 
22 See id. 
23 See Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict  pmbl., Aug. 7, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter Hague Convention 1954]. 
24 See Nat’l Archives, supra note 1, at 1. 
25 See id. at 1, 4 & 6 (describing U.S. large-scale and international protection of cultural 
property effort during World War II); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth., Den.) 
1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20) (indicating practice establishing international customary law 
must have sufficient degree of participation, especially by affected states); Geneva Conven-
tion 1949, supra note 8, art. 53; see also Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 
(Nov. 20) (indicating consistency in State practice is a consideration in determining 
whether international customary law established). 
26 See Nat’l Archives, supra note 1, at 1. 
27 See id. at 1 & 4. 
28 See id. at 4 & 6. 
29 See id. at 4. 
30 See id. at 1 & 5. 
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 In 1956, eight years after the Roberts Commission’s termination, 
the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict (1954 Hague Convention) entered into 
force.31 Though the United States is not a party to this Convention, the 
goals the Convention espouses are consistent with the actions the 
United States took in forming the MFAA.32 Though there is an ex-
tremely high threshold for establishing international customary law,33 it 
is evident that at the very least there exists a discernible international 
movement toward the protection of cultural property—and that the 
United States has recognized the move.34
II. Discussion 
 As a result of the extensive looting of the National Museum of 
Iraq, the United States may have violated both treaty35 and customary 
international law.36 The United States is a ratifying party to the 1949 
Geneva Convention37, which may contain restrictive terms limiting an 
occupying power’s right to destroy property of the occupied state.38 
International customary law may also bind the United States, which 
potentially recognized international customary law through its action 
during World War II.39
A. Geneva Conventions and Protection of Cultural Property 
 The disastrous effects of World War II on civilians inspired the 
1949 Geneva Convention.40 The 1949 Geneva Convention provisions 
were meant to supplement rather than invalidate the earlier conven-
                                                                                                                      
31 See Hague Convention 1954, supra note 23; Nat’l Archives, supra note 1. 
32 Compare Hague Convention 1954, supra note 23, pmbl. (agreeing to “take all possi-
ble steps to protect cultural property” from “damage”), with Nat’l Archives, supra note 1, 
at 3 (explaining MFAA responsible for “protecting” cultural property from “damage”). 
33 See, e.g., Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. at 277. 
34 See Nat’l Archives, supra note 1, at 4. 
35 See Geneva Convention 1949, supra note 8, art. 53; Hague Convention 1907, supra 
note 20, arts. 43 & 56. 
36 See Nat’l Archives, supra note 1, at 1; see, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. 
v. Neth., Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20). 
37 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, State Parties—1949 Geneva Convention, http://www. 
icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
38 See Geneva Convention 1949, supra note 8, art. 53. 
39 See Nat’l Archives, supra note 1, at 4; North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 277. 
40 See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention, http://www. 
icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/380?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 27, 2009). 
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tion provisions.41 The United States was a party to both the earlier con-
ventions as well as the 1949 Geneva Convention.42
 The 1949 Geneva Convention binds the United States as a ratifying 
party to comply with the Convention’s provisions as an occupying 
power in Iraq at least so long as the period of occupation.43 The looting 
of the National Museum of Iraq occurred during the period of occupa-
tion and thus subjects the United States to review for compliance with 
Geneva Convention provisions.44
 Article 53 of the 1949 Geneva Convention prohibits the “destruc-
tion by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging . . . 
to the State or to other public authorities . . . unless such destruction is 
rendered absolutely necessary.”45 Although the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion generally deals with individual civilian protection, the negotiating 
parties agreed to refer in Article 53 to State property despite the provi-
sion’s reach somewhat beyond the scope of the Convention.46 The ne-
gotiation parties’ departure from the subject matter of the Convention 
in this provision reveals its importance; the fact that the parties make 
note of this departure in the Commentaries further demonstrates that 
the provision is central rather than aberrational.47
  The negotiating parties’ Commentaries also note that Article 53 
must be understood in a “very wide sense.”48 The parties’ decision to 
extend the Article’s protection to State property is in accordance with a 
broad understanding of the 1949 Geneva Convention’s intent to afford 
protection to civilians.49 The intent of the 1949 Geneva Convention 
with regard to Article 53 is further clarified because Article 53 serves to 
reinforce rules previously laid out in the 1907 Hague Convention.50
 Article 56 of the 1907 Hague Convention protects property of “in-
stitutions dedicated to . . . the arts and sciences, even when State prop-
erty,” from “seizure . . . destruction or willful damage” by an occupying 
power at the risk of “legal proceedings.”51 The Article declares destruc-
                                                                                                                      
41 See id. 
42 See Geneva Convention 1949, supra note 8; Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 
40. 
43 See Geneva Convention 1949, supra note 8, arts. 2 & 6. 
44 See id.; Security Council Press Release, supra note 8, annex II. 
45 Geneva Convention 1949, supra note 8, art. 53. 
46 See id. art. 53 cmt. 1. 
47 See id. 
48 Id. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 Hague Convention 1907, supra note 20, art. 56. 
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tive occupying power activity “forbidden,” a term also used in reference 
to pillaging activity by the occupying power.52 As in the 1949 Geneva 
Convention, the breadth of the Article is strengthened by its clarity and 
unconditional terms.53
 If the United States is subject to “legal proceedings” due to the de-
struction and loss of the National Museum of Iraq’s artifacts, the United 
States’ accountability will be dependent on whether or not its failure to 
prevent the organized and sustained looting of the museum can be con-
sidered destruction or “willful damage.”54 It is clear that treaty law binds 
an occupying power to refrain from destruction of property at the same 
time that it extends protection to arts institutions, although State 
owned, like the National Museum of Iraq.55 It is less clear, however, what 
level of protection the United States is bound to offer those institutions 
and whether the knowledge of museum looting and subsequent lack of 
a response can be equated with willful destruction.56
B. Possible Sources of International Customary Law 
 If the United States is not held accountable under treaty law for 
the looting of the National Museum of Iraq, it may nonetheless be ac-
countable under international customary law.57 The potential sources 
of international customary law that could be applied to the looting of 
the National Museum of Iraq are treaties and instances of the United 
States and other States protecting occupied States’ arts or cultural insti-
tutions.58
 The 1907 Hague Convention’s substantive provisions are consid-
ered embodiments of international customary law.59 As such, they bind 
the entire international community rather than strictly the ratifying 
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. arts. 47 & 56. 
53 Compare Hague Convention 1907, supra note 20, art. 56 (declaring destruction of 
cultural property “forbidden”), with Geneva Convention 1949, supra note 8, art. 53 (declar-
ing destruction of cultural property “prohibited”). 
54 See Geneva Convention 1949, supra note 8, art. 53; Hague Convention 1907, supra 
note 20, art. 56. 
55 See Geneva Convention 1949, supra note 8, arts. 2, 4 & 53; Hague Convention 1907, 
supra note 20, art. 56. 
56 See Geneva Convention 1949, supra note 8, art. 53; Hague Convention 1907, supra 
note 20, art. 56. 
57 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, U.N. 
Charter annex. 
58 See id. art. 38. 
59 See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Hague Convention 1907, http://www.icrc.org/ihl. 
nsf/INTRO/195?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 27, 2009). 
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parties.60 If Article 56 is considered substantive, it would be doubly 
binding on the United States as customary and treaty law.61 Further-
more, if Article 56 is considered customary law, the definition of de-
struction and willful damage is determined by the international com-
munity’s common practices.62
 Even before European art and arts institutions were devastated 
during World War II, the United States recognized the universal value 
of arts institutions and the terrible social cost of their destruction in 
wartime.63 In 1935, the United States entered the Roerich Pact with 21 
other North and South American States.64 The object of the Roerich 
Pact was the preservation of arts institutions and immovable monu-
ments in face of hostilities.65 Though the protection afforded by the 
Roerich Pact is focused against bombing and targeted destruction, the 
Pact nonetheless broadly requires that arts institutions be “respected 
and protected by belligerents.”66
 The Roerich Pact of North and South America inspired the rest of 
the world to establish the 1954 Hague Convention.67 More than 100 
states from Asia, Europe and Africa ratified this treaty.68 The treaty cen-
ters on the protection of cultural property—which encompasses arts 
institutions like the National Museum of Iraq—from destruction dur-
ing wartime and times of peace.69 The treaty manifests a two-sided ef-
fort, whereby possessor States act in peacetime to devise means of pro-
tection for their cultural property while hostile States act in wartime to 
refrain from the destruction of cultural property.70 Article 4 of the 1954 
Hague Convention explicitly requires states to “prohibit, prevent, and, 
                                                                                                                      
60 See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South–West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 47 ( June 21). 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 Roerich Pact and Banner of Peace, http://www.roerich.org/nr_pact_banner.html 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2009). 
64 Id. 
65 See Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic 
Monuments, preamble, Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3267, 167 L.N.T.S. 289 [hereinafter Roerich 
Pact]. 
66 Id. art. 1. 
67 See Hague Convention 1954, supra note 23, arts. 1–7; Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, 
Hague Convention 1954, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/400?OpenDocument (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
68 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 67. 
69 See Hague Convention 1954, supra note 23, preamble, art. 1. 
70 See id. arts. 3 & 4. 
2009] An Examination of the Looting of the National Museum of Iraq 431 
if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage, or misappropria-
tion” of cultural property.71
 The Roerich Pact read together with the Hague Convention seem 
to present a united front of States, encompassing the entire globe.72 
The States share a common burden of protecting their own and other 
States’ cultural property to ensure the common benefit of posterity’s 
enjoyment and understanding of great works and history.73 Though the 
United States is not a party to the Hague Convention for Protection of 
Cultural Property, it is a signatory and is thus at least nominally tied to 
both treaties.74
 If the United States’ concern for cultural property is exclusively 
reserved for that of the Americas, its concern runs counter to the pur-
pose of the Roerich Pact—and the majority of the parties and signato-
ries to the Roerich Pact, recognizing this, also are parties to the 1954 
Hague Convention.75 The United States’ interest in the preservation of 
international cultural property should be strengthened in recognition 
of American diversity and the possibility, therefore, that many Ameri-
cans may be tied to cultural property located outside the Americas.76 
Furthermore, as war becomes increasingly global in nature, an empha-
sis is placed on the need for more extensive international protection in 
wartime.77 The large number of State parties that have committed 
                                                                                                                      
71 Id. art. 4. 
72 Compare Roerich Pact, supra note 65, with Int’l Council on Monuments and Sites, 
Ratifiers of Hague Convention of 1954, http://www.icomos.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO400?Open 
Document (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) (revealing State parties represent most world conti-
nents). 
73 See generally Hague Convention 1954, supra note 23, art. 2 (declaring “protection of 
cultural property shall comprise the safeguarding of and respect for such property”); Ro-
erich Pact, supra note 65, art. 1 (declaring cultural property must be “respected and pro-
tected” by both “belligerents” and “personnel of institutions”). 
74 See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, State Signatories—Hague Convention 1954, http:// 
www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=400&ps=S (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
75 See Roerich Pact, supra note 65, preamble (stating purpose of treaty is to preserve 
“all nationally and privately owned . . . monuments which form the cultural treasure of 
peoples”). Compare Int’l Council on Monuments and Sites, supra note 72, with Roerich 
Pact, supra note 67 (illuminating fact only two parties to Roerich Pact not also parties to 
1954 Hague Convention). 
76 See Jessica Eve Morrow, The National Stolen Property Act and the Return of Stolen Cultural 
Property to Its Rightful Foreign Owners, 30 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 249, 251 (2007). 
77 See Michael McAndrew, Wrangling in the Shadows: The Use of the United States Special 
Forces in Covert Military Operations in the War on Terror, 29 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 153, 
153–54 (2006). 
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themselves by treaty to the preservation of cultural property in wartime 
is an indication of international customary law.78
 The joint reading of the Roerich Pact with the 1954 Hague Con-
vention to demonstrate an international custom of protecting the pos-
sessor state’s cultural property like museums is encouraged by several 
concrete and consistent examples of States’ behavior in wartime.79 The 
National Museum of Beirut acted to protect its cultural heritage during 
hostilities in the 1970s and 1980s.80 Iraq acted to protect museums in 
Kuwait, though ultimately about twenty percent of the museum artifacts 
were lost.81 Russia requisitioned a huge number of artifacts from Ger-
many after World War II that had been taken from German Jews during 
Nazi rule but failed to consistently return the artifacts to the owners.82 
Though State behavior is indicative of an international custom, assess-
ment of whether the United States failed to adhere to international 
custom in its failure to protect the National Museum of Iraq is compli-
cated by the fact that the United States did not affirmatively destroy, but 
instead failed to protect, cultural property.83
III. Analysis 
 If the United States’ failure to protect the National Museum of 
Iraq from looting is to be considered destruction of cultural property in 
violation of international customary or treaty law, there are several 
courses of action the United States and the international community 
may take to remedy the situation.84
                                                                                                                      
78 See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 42; Roerich Pact, supra note 65; Int’l 
Council on Monuments and Sites, supra note 72. 
79 See North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 42; Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J. at 277. 
80 Neil Brodie, Focus on Iraq: Spoils of War, 56 Archaeology 4, July/Aug. 2003, available 
at http://www.archaeology.org/0307/etc/war.html. 
81 Id. 
82 Associated Press, Trophy Art Collection Displayed in Moscow, Russ. J., Mar. 3, 2003, 
available at http://www.russiajournal.com/node/14986. 
83 See Hague Convention 1954, supra note 23, art. 4.3 (requiring merely that States 
“undertake” to prevent looting); Roerich Pact, supra note 65, art. 2 (failing to detail re-
quirements of “protection and respect due to” cultural property). 
84 See Brodie, supra note 80; see also Corine Wegener, Cultural Heritage Disaster Preparedness 
and Response, 2003 Int’l council of museums 253, 254, available at http://icom.museum/ 
disaster_preparedness_book/country/wegener.pdf; P. Ishwara Bhat, Protection of Cultural 
Property Under International Humanitarian Law: Some Emerging Trends, 2001 Indian Soc. of 
Int’l L. Y.B. of Int’l Humanitarian & Refugee L. 4, 10, available at http://www.worldlii. 
org/int/journals/ISILYBIHRL/2001/4.html. 
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A. Trial: The United States Before the International Community 
 The International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) was established to punish those responsible for the war atroci-
ties committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.85 
The approbation of the ICTY demonstrates not only the seriousness of 
the war crimes committed, but also the international community’s 
condemnation of the acts.86
 A crime specifically addressed by the ICTY was the destruction of 
cultural property during wartime; the ICTY was especially concerned by 
the destruction of the Mostar Bridge and Old Town of Dubrovnik by 
Serb-controlled federal troops.87 The bridge and historic village were 
considered cultural property because the former was a symbol of the 
connection between the area’s Muslim and Croat communities and the 
latter was a town dating to the year 667 A.D.88 Commentators have 
characterized the destruction of these pieces of cultural property as an 
“instrument to erase the manifestation of the adversary’s identity”89 
and an insult to the “memory of humanity.”90
 In the midst of the destruction of human life and dignity in the 
war in the former Yugoslavia, it is significant that the ICTY addressed 
the destruction of cultural property.91 Although the war in the former 
Yugoslavia was not international in character, but rather civil, and thus 
not subject to any sanctions under the 1954 Hague Convention, the 
ICTY nonetheless investigated and renounced the destruction of cul-
tural property.92 Furthermore, the ICTY cited the 1949 Geneva Con-
vention as relevant authority, a convention also applicable to the 
United States but with added force because its hypothetical dispute 
with Iraq would be international in character and thus clearly subject to 
international treaty law.93
 The ICTY’s considerations illustrate the international community’s 
conception of the severity of destruction of cultural property during 
                                                                                                                      
85 Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed Conflict: The Practice 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 14 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 1, 3 
(2001). 
86 See id. at 3–4. 
87 U.N. Security Council, Comm’n of Experts, Destruction of Cultural Property Report, 
sec. I(c), S/1994/674/Add. 2 (Vol. V) (Dec. 28, 1994) (prepared by M. Keba M’Baye). 
88 Id. secs. III(a), II(a). 
89 Abtahi, supra note 85, at 1. 
90 Id. at 32. 
91 See U.N. Security Council, supra note 87, sec. II(c); Abtahi, supra note 85, at 1. 
92 U.N. Security Council, supra note 87, sec. I(b). 
93 See id. 
434 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 32:423 
wartime and occupation.94 In the unlikely event, due to political rea-
sons, that the United States is subject to such considerations, sanctions 
would be imposed because the dispute with Iraq is international in 
character and thus within the jurisdiction of the relevant binding Ge-
neva Conventions.95 As such, the United States should follow either or 
both of two courses of action in anticipation or recognition of those 
sanctions.96
1. Funding to Alleviate National Museum of Iraq Losses 
 Perhaps the most obvious course of action the United States can 
take to alleviate the National Museum of Iraq’s losses is some sort of 
monetary contribution.97 Whether the monetary contribution takes the 
form of a sum representing the worth of the cultural property losses or 
supplies meant to facilitate the repair and restore process, the course of 
action will serve the dual purpose of sanctioning the United States and 
aiding the National Museum of Iraq.98 Though this course of action 
may be the easiest, it is far from the best.99
 Ironically, monetary contribution may be counter-productive.100 
The U.S. State Department has already sent the National Museum of 
Iraq new office furniture, computers, air conditioners and other sup-
plies.101 One commentator, who served the United States in the protec-
tion of arts, monuments and other cultural property as an Army Re-
serve major and arts curator, felt that the empty shipment of supplies 
was not only unnecessary, but also burdensome and duplicative.102 In-
deed, the commentator noted that it would be far more valuable for 
the United States to commit its experts or at least a designated, long-
term volunteer team.103 Without coordination between National Mu-
seum of Iraq restoration personnel and the United States, the use of 
monetary contribution will continue to be ineffective—and thus ulti-
mately meaningless.104
                                                                                                                      
94 See id. sec. I(c). 
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 The United States should also be wary of offering monetary con-
tributions in the form of rewards for the return of cultural property.105 
If rewards are too sizable, the United States may unintentionally add an 
incentive to continue looting or illicitly trading stolen cultural prop-
erty.106 Furthermore, if the United States awards the return of cultural 
property from outside Iraq, the United States succeeds in merely sus-
taining the market of looted cultural property from the National Mu-
seum of Iraq.107 Perhaps the only workable form of monetary contribu-
tion in the form of rewards would be for cultural property that is 
readily identified as belonging to the National Museum of Iraq, thereby 
limiting market sustenance and avoiding incentive to loot cultural 
property from other sites for reward.108
2. Contribution Beyond Funding 
 Aside from the practical difficulties resulting from monetary con-
tributions, the global significance of cultural property may render U.S. 
monetary contributions a shallow attempt, at best, to match the value 
of the cultural property lost.109 The United States may serve the dual 
purposes of appeasing the dismayed international community and 
meeting the losses of the National Museum of Iraq by organizing its 
educated experts and pledging them to the museum.110
 The United States currently has military personnel committed to 
the preservation of cultural property, a liaison with the Ministry of Cul-
ture at the former Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).111 Because it 
was difficult for additional support to get clearance with the CPA, how-
ever, and because military personnel are in a constant state of flux, the 
personnel committed are ill-suited to the task of a large-scale and detail-
oriented museum restoration effort.112 Without a treaty specifically re-
questing a more focused effort, it appears the United States will resign 
itself to the provision of inadequate personnel.113
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 The United States could take steps to replace the current person-
nel with an educated, trained and expert group.114 The group would 
lend the needed infrastructure for a large-scale restoration effort.115 
With a consolidated effort, the United States could invite and grant 
clearance to curators and restoration professionals from around the 
world.116 The group could serve not only to provide updated training 
to the Iraqi professionals currently at work, but could prove invaluable 
in the restoration of the National Museum of Iraq’s building, damaged 
artifacts, and storage collection.117
B. Ratification of 1954 Hague Convention: Clarity for the Future 
 The United States can avoid the international community’s con-
demnation and the uncertainty of the repercussions for its actions 
against cultural property by ratifying the 1954 Hague Convention.118 By 
so doing, the United States would clarify its responsibilities during war-
time by subjecting the effects of its actions to international treaty law.119
 The United Kingdom has also been reticent in ratifying the 1954 
Hague Convention.120 There is an ongoing movement to encourage its 
ratification, largely inspired by the events at the National Museum of 
Iraq.121 Though the United Kingdom previously stated concerns about 
retaining the right to use methods of warfare that may unavoidably de-
stroy cultural property, its Ministry of Defense speculated that future 
conflicts will likely be geographically restricted and fought using stan-
dard methods of warfare.122 The United States may likewise be con-
cerned that the 1954 Hague Convention is not practicable in light of 
the possibility of global or nuclear warfare, but if the resolution of the 
United Kingdom is valid, the United States’ concern may no longer be 
as dominant.123
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 The United States’ ratification of the 1954 Hague Convention will 
be consistent with ideals already espoused by the MFAA and the Ro-
erich Pact.124 While the United States may have abstained from ratify-
ing the 1954 Hague Convention to avoid accountability in the event of 
extreme circumstances and to retain the freedom to choose the most 
effective means of warfare, its decision has had the opposite effect in 
practice.125 In not ratifying the 1954 Hague Convention, the United 
States remains accountable to the international community and further 
loses the ability to exercise control over how and when it will be held 
accountable.126 The United States may have to affirmatively act to pro-
tect cultural property, and in that sense loses some freedom in means 
of warfare.127 What it gains, however, is the freedom as an occupying 
power to control the resources and personnel devoted to protecting 
cultural property where it otherwise would have been forced to do 
so.128
 Ultimately, accepting responsibility for the protection of cultural 
property through ratification of 1954 Hague Convention would ensure 
that future responsibility for the destruction of cultural property on an 
unpredictable international scale is avoided in that the United States 
would be able to exercise more discretion in acting on its obligation.129 
When the trade of responsibilities is accomplished, the safety of cul-
tural property is achieved.130
Conclusion 
 The organized looting of the National Museum of Iraq in April 
2003 was a preventable disaster. If the United States had accepted its 
obligation under either international treaty or customary law, it could 
have exercised more care in protecting Iraq’s cultural property. Indeed, 
the National Museum of Iraq’s injury is felt by the entire international 
community because the ancient artifacts lost and damaged represent a 
shared history irreparably damaged. 
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 The United States may act to ameliorate the situation by both look-
ing to the future and remedying the past. To clarify its responsibility to 
reasonably protect cultural property in times of war in the future, the 
United States should ratify the 1954 Hague Convention. A limited re-
ward system for returned artifacts could be practicable, but the United 
States should strongly consider the possibility of assembling a group of 
experts to aid in the restoration of the museum and its priceless arti-
facts as a more effective and well-tailored remedy to the unique form of 
destruction wrought upon the National Museum of Iraq. 
 The United States has known the benefit of cooperating interna-
tionally to preserve cultural property through its experiences with the 
MFAA and the Roerich Pact. It should act again to protect cultural 
property after the looting of the National Museum of Iraq, and in so 
doing, act for the benefit of the thousands of years of civilization that 
the artifacts embody. 
